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Abstract. In a continuous time stochastic economy, this paper considers the problem of con-
sumption and investment in a financial market in which the representative investor exhibits a
change in the discount rate. The investment opportunities are a stock and a riskless account.
The market coefficients and discount factor switches according to a finite state Markov chain.
The change in the discount rate leads to time inconsistencies of the investor’s decisions. The
randomness in our model is driven by a Brownian motion and Markov chain. Following [3] we
introduce and characterize the equilibrium policies for power utility functions. Moreover, they
are computed in closed form for logarithmic utility function. We show that a higher discount rate
leads to a higher equilibrium consumption rate. Numerical experiments show the effect of both
time preference and risk aversion on the equilibrium policies.
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1
1 Introduction
Dynamic asset allocation in a stochastic paradigm received a lot of scrutiny lately. The first
papers in this area are [11] and [12]. Many works then followed, most of them assuming an
exponential discount rate. [3] has given an overview of the literature in the context of Merton
portfolio management problem with exponential discounting.
The issue of discounting was the subject of many studies in financial economics. Several
papers stepped away from the exponential discounting modeling, and based on empirical and
experimental evidence proposed different discount models. They can be organised in two classes:
exogenous discount rates and endogenous discount rates. In the first class the most well known
example is the hyperbolic discounting. This type discounts near future more heavily than distant
future which is in accordance with the experimental findings. [3] and [4] discuss about this class
of discounting.
The concept of endogenous time preference was developed by [8] in a discrete time formulation.
[17] considered the continuous time version which was later extended by [6]. The class of discount
rates emerged in response to the following two observed phenomena: “decreasing marginal impa-
tience” DMI and “increasing marginal impatience” IMI. DMI means that the lower the level of
consumption, the more heavily an agent discount the future. IMI is just the opposite: the higher
the level of consumption, the more heavily an agent discount the future. Some papers support
DMI, e.g. [1], others advocate for IMI, [15].
In this paper we consider a regime switching model for the financial market. This modeling is
consistent with some cyclicality observed in financial markets. Many papers considered these types
of markets for pricing derivative securities. Here we recall only two such works, [7] and [5]. In [7],
the author considers a stock price model which allows for the drift and the volatility coefficients to
switch according to two-states. This market is incomplete, but is completed with new securities.
In [5] the problem of option pricing is considered in a model where the risky underlying assets are
driven by Markov-modulated Geometric Brownian motions. A regime switching Esscher transform
is used in order to find a martingale pricing measure. When it comes to optimal investment in
regime switching markets we point to [14]. In their paper they allow for the risk preference to
switch according to the regime.
The discount rate in our paper is stochastic, exogenous and it depends on the regime. By
the best of our knowledge is the first work to consider stochastic discounting within the Merton
problem framework. In a discrete time model, [16] considers a cyclical discount factor.
Non constant discount rates lead to time inconsistency of the decision maker as shown in [3]
and [4]. The resolution is to consider subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. These are strategies
which are optimal to implement now given that they will be implemented in the future. After we
introduce this concept we try to characterize it. In order to achieve this goal the methodology
developed in [4] is employed. That is a new result in stochastic control theory: it mixes the idea of
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value function (from the dynamic programming principle) with the idea that in the future “optimal
trading strategies” are implemented (from the maximum principle of Pontryagin). The new twist
in our paper is the Markov chain, and the mathematical ingredient used is Itoˆ′s formula for the
Markov-modulated diffusions. Thus, we obtain a system of four equations: first equation says
that the value function is equal to the continuation utility of subgame perfect strategies; second
equation is the wealth equation generated by subgame perfect strategies; the last two equations
relate the value function to the subgame perfect strategies. The end result is a complicated system
of PDEs, SDE and a nonlinear equation with a nonlocal term. The investor’s risk preference in
this model is of CRRA type which suggest an ansatz for the value function (it disentangles the
time, the space and the Markov chain state component). This result in subgame perfect strategies
which are time/state dependent and linear in wealth. In the special case of logarithmic utility we
can compute them explicitly. If constant discount rates, we notice that subgame perfect strategies
coincide with the optimal ones.
The goal of this paper is twofold: first, to consider a model with stochastic discount rates
and second, to study the relationship between consumption and discount rates (which resembles
IMI and/or DMI ). In the Merton problem with constant discount rates we show that higher
the discount rate higher the consumption rate (this is somehow an inverse relationship to IMI).
We explore this relationship in our model with stochastic discount rates. Numerical experiments
revealed that the consumption rate is higher in the market states with higher discount rate. We
provide an analytic proof of this result for the special case of logarithmic utility. This result
is somehow consistent with the discount rate monotonocity of consumption rate in the Merton
problem. It can also explain the IMI effect: if we observe the consumption rate, then a possible
upside jump can be linked to a jump in the discount rate and vice versa. The effect of risk aversion
on the consumption rate is analysed. Here the results are consistent with [11] and [12]. That is
consumption rate is increasing in time for most levels of risk aversion except at very high levels
when is decreasing ( this can be explained by the investor’s increased appetite for risk which leads
to more investment in the risky asset and a deceasing consumption rate).
The reminder of this paper is organized as follow. In section 2 we describe the model and
formulate the objective. Section 3 contains the main result under the power utility and logarithmic
utility. In section 4, we present the numerical results. Section 5 examines consumption versus
discount rate. The paper ends with an appendix containing the proofs.
2 The Model
2.1 The Financial Market
Consider a probability space (Ω, {Ft}0≤t≤T ,F ,P), which accommodates a standard Brownian
motion W = {W (t), t ≥ 0} and a homogeneous finite state continuous time Markov Chain (MC)
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J = {J(t), t ≥ 0}. For simplicity assume that MC takes values in S = {0,1}. Our results hold
true in the more general situation of S having finitely many states. The filtration {Ft}0≤t≤∞ is
the completed filtration generated by {W (t)}t∈[0,∞) and {J(t)}t∈[0,∞), that is Ft = F
J
t
∨
FWt .
We assume that the stochastic processes W and J are independent. The MC J has a generator
Λ = [λij ]S×S with λij ≥ 0 for i 6= j, and
∑
j∈S λij = 0 for every i ∈ S.
In our setup the financial market consists of a bank account B and a risky asset S, that are
traded continuously over a finite time horizon [0, T ] (here T ∈ (0,∞) is an exogenously given
deterministic time). The price process of the bank account and risky asset are governed by the
following Markov-modulated SDE:
dB(t) = r(t, J(t))B(t)dt,
dS(t) = S(t) [α(t, J(t)) dt+ σ(t, J(t)) dW (t)] , 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞,
where B(0) = 1 and S(0) = s > 0 are the initial prices. The functions r(t, i), α(t, i), σ(t, i) : i ∈ S,
are assumed to be deterministic, positive and continuous in t. Given the state i of the MC at t
they represent the riskless rate, the stock volatility and the stock return. Moreover
µ(t, i) , α(t, i) − r(t, i)
stands for the stock excess return.
2.2 Investment-consumption strategies and wealth processes
In our model, a representative investor continuously invests in the stock,bond and consumes. An
acceptable investment-consumption strategy is defined below:
Definition 2.1. An R2-valued stochastic process {u(t) := (π(t), c(t))}t∈[0,∞) is called an admis-
sible strategy process and write u ∈ A if it is Ft− progressively measurable and it satisfies the
following integrability condition
E[
∫ t
0
|π(s)µ(s, J(s)) − c(s)| ds +
∫ t
0
|π(s)σ(s, J(s))|2 ds] <∞, a.s., for all t ∈ [0,∞). (2.1)
Here π(t) stands for the dollar value invested in stock at time t and c(t) ≥ 0 for the consump-
tion. Xu(t) := X(t) represents the wealth of the investor at time t associated with the trading
strategy u; it satisfies the following stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dX(t) = (r(t, J(t))Xu(t) + µ(t, J(t))π(t)− c(t)) dt + σ(t, J(t))π(t) dW (t), (2.2)
where X(0) = x > 0 is the initial wealth and J0 = i ∈ S is initial state. This SDE is called
the self-financing condition. Under the regularity condition (2.1) imposed on {π(t), c(t)}t∈[0,∞)
above, the SDE (2.2) admits a unique strong solution. In the end of this section, we introduce
further assumptions.
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Assumption 2.2. The utility function of the investor is of CRRA type, i.e.,
U(x) =
xγ
γ
where γ < 1, γ 6= 0.
Thus, the inverse marginal utility function is
I(x) , (U ′)−1(x) = x
1
γ−1 . (2.3)
Assumption 2.3. For any risk aversion level γ < 1, the following inequalities hold
E sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X(t)|γ <∞. (2.4)
E sup
t∈[0,T ]
|c(t)|γ <∞. (2.5)
2.3 The discount rate
As we mentioned in the introduction, this paper considers stochastic discount rates. An easy way
to achieve this is to let the discount rate depend on the state of MC. Thus, at some intermediate
time t ∈ [0, T ] the discount are is ρJ(t), for some positive constants ρ0 and ρ1. The intuition of this
way of modeling discount rate stems from the connection between market state and discount rates
(this can be explained by some models with endogenous discount rate which may be influenced
by economic factors).
2.4 The Risk Criterion
In our model, the investor decides what investment/consumption strategy to choose according to
the expected utility risk criterion. Thus, investor’s goal is to maximize utility of intertemporal
consumption and final wealth. The novelty here is that we allow investor to update the risk
criterion and to reconsider the optimal strategies she/he computed in the past. This will lead to a
time inconsistent behavior as we show below. Let the agent start with a given positive wealth x,
and a given market state i, at some instant t. The optimal t−trading strategy {π˜t(s), c˜t(s)}s∈[t,T ]
is chosen such that
sup
u∈A
E
[∫ T
t
e−ρi(u−t)U(c(u)) du + e−ρi(T−t)U(X(T ))|X(t) = x, J(t) = i
]
= Ex,it
[∫ T
t
e−ρi(u−t)U(c˜t(u)) du + e
−ρi(T−t)U(X˜(T ))
]
.
Throughout the paper we denote Ex,it [] , E [|X(t) = x, J(t) = i] . The optimal t−trading strategy
{π˜t(s), c˜t(s)}s∈[t,T ] is derived by the supermartingale/martingale principle. This leads to the
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Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
∂V
∂s
(t, s, x, i) + sup
π,c
[
(rx+ µπ − c)
∂V
∂x
(t, s, x, i) +
1
2
σ2π2
∂2V
∂x2
(t, s, x, i) + U(c)
]
(2.6)
−ρiV (t, s, x, i) +
∑
j∈S
λijV (t, s, x, j) = 0,
with the boundary condition
V (t, T, x, i) = U(x). (2.7)
Here i stands for the value of MC at time t. Thus, the HJB depends on the current time t ( through
ρi) and this dependence is inherited by the t−optimal trading strategy. This in turn leads to time
inconsistencies. The resolution is to introduce subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. They are
optimal now given that they will be implemented in the future.
3 The Main Result
3.1 The subgame perfect trading strategies
For a policy process {u(t) , π(t), c(t)}t∈[0,T ] satisfying (2.1) and its corresponding wealth process
{X(t)}t∈[0,T ] given by (2.2), we denote the expected utility functional by
J(t, x, i, π, c) , Ex,it
[∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)U(c(s)) ds + e−ρi(T−t)U(X(T ))
]
. (3.8)
Following [3] we shall give a rigorous mathematical formulation of the equilibrium strategies in
the formal definition below.
Definition 3.1. Let F = (F1, F2) : [0, T ]×R
+×S → R+×S be a map such that for any t, x > 0
and i ∈ S
lim inf
ǫ↓0
J(t, x, i, F1, F2)− J(t, x, i, πǫ, cǫ)
ǫ
≥ 0, (3.9)
where
J(t, x, i, F1, F2) , J(t, x, i, π¯, c¯),
π¯(s) , F1(s, X¯(s), J(s)), c¯(s) , F2(s, X¯(s), J(s)), (3.10)
and {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[t,T ] satisfies (2.1). Here, the process {X¯(s)}s∈[t,T ] is the wealth corresponding
to {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[t,T ]. The process {πǫ(s), cǫ(s)}s∈[t,T ] is another investment-consumption strategy
defined by
πǫ(s) =

π¯(s), s ∈ [t, T ]\Eǫ,tπ(s), s ∈ Eǫ,t, (3.11)
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cǫ(s) =

c¯(s), s ∈ [t, T ]\Eǫ,tc(s), s ∈ Eǫ,t, (3.12)
with Eǫ,t = [t, t + ǫ]; {π(s), c(s)}s∈Eǫ,t is any trading strategy for which {πǫ(s), cǫ(s)}s∈[t,T ] is an
admissible policy. If (3.9) holds true, then {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[t,T ] is a subgame perfect strategy.
3.2 The value function
Our goal is in a first step to characterize the subgame perfect strategies and then to find them.
Inspired by [3], the value function v satisfies
v(t, x, i) = Ex,it
[∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) ds + e
−ρi(T−t)U(X¯(T ))
]
. (3.13)
Recall that {X¯(s)}s∈[0,T ] is the wealth process corresponding to {π¯(s), c¯(s)}s∈[t,T ], so it solves the
SDE
dX¯(s)=[r(s, J(s))X¯(s)+µ(s, J(s))F1(s, X¯(s), J(s))−F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))]ds+σ(s, J(s))F1(s, X¯(s))dW (s).
(3.14)
Moreover, F = (F1, F2) is given by
F1(t, x, i) = −
µ(t, i)∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)
σ2(t, i)∂
2v
∂x2
(t, x, i)
, F2(t, x, i) = I
(
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.15)
Thus, the value function is characterized by a system of four equations: one integral equation
with nonlocal term (3.13), one SDE (3.14) and two PDEs (3.15). Of course the existence of such
a function v satisfying the equations above is not a trivial issue. We will take advantage of the
special form of the utility function to simplify the problem of finding v. We search for:
v(t, x, i) = g(t, i)
xγ
γ
, x ≥ 0, (3.16)
where the function g(t, i) is to be found. We consider the case γ 6= 0 (the case of logarithmic
utility will be treated separately). In the light of equations (3.15) one gets
F1(t, x, i) =
µ(t, i)x
σ2(t, i)(1 − γ)
, F2(t, x, i) = g
1
γ−1 (t, i)x. (3.17)
By (3.14), the associated wealth process satisfies the following SDE:
dX¯(s) =
[
r(s, J(s)) +
µ2(s, J(s))
σ2(s, J(s))(1 − γ)
− g
1
γ−1 (s, J(s))
]
X¯(s)ds
+
µ(s, J(s))
σ(s, J(s))(1 − γ)
X¯(s)dW (s). (3.18)
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This is a linear SDE which can be easily solved. By plugging v of (3.16) into (3.13) (with
F1, F2 of (3.17) and X¯ of (3.18), we obtain the following equation for g(t, i), i ∈ S :
∂g
∂t
(t, i) + [γr(t, i) +
µ2(t, i)γ
2σ2(t, i)(1 − γ)
− ρi]g(t, i) +
∑
j∈S
λijg(t, j) + (1− γ)g
γ
γ−1 (t, i) = 0, (3.19)
with the final condition g(T, i) = 1. Next we show that there exists a unique solution of this ODE
system. Let us summarize these findings:
Lemma 3.2. There exists a unique continuously differentiable solution g(t, i), i ∈ S of the system
(3.19). Furthermore, v(t, x, i) = g(t, i)x
γ
γ
is a value function, meaning that v solves (3.13) with
F1, F2 of (3.17) and X¯ of (3.18).
Appendix A proves this Lemma.

The following Theorem states the central result of our paper.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that v(t, x, i) is given by (3.16) with g(t, i), i ∈ S the solution of the
system (3.19). Let X¯ be the solution of SDE (3.18). Then {π¯(t), c¯(t)}s∈[0,T ] given by
π¯(t) =
µ(t, J(t))X(t)
σ2(t, J(t))(1 − γ)
, c¯(t) = g
1
γ−1 (t, J(t))X(t), (3.20)
is a subgame perfect strategy.
Appendix B proves this Theorem.

Remark 3.4. In the case of constant discount rate, i.e., ρ0 = ρ1, the subgame perfect strategies
coincide with optimal ones. This can be seen by looking at the integral equation (6.34) which is
exactly HJB (2.6) (after the first order conditions are implemented).
Next we turn to the special case of logarithmic utility.
3.3 Logarithmic Utility
When the risk aversion γ = 0, we search for the value function v of the following form:
v(t, x, i) = h(t, i) log(x) + l(t, i). (3.21)
Arguing as in the previous subsection we find that the functions h, l : [0, T ] × S → R+ should
satisfy the following system of equations:
∂h
∂t
(t, i) − ρih(t, i) +
∑
j∈S
λijh(t, j) + 1 = 0, (3.22)
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∂l
∂t
(t, i) + (r(t, i) +
µ2(t, i)
2σ2(t, i)
)h(t, i) − log l(t, i) − ρil(t, i) +
∑
j∈S
λijl(t, j) − 1 = 0,
with the final conditions h(T, i) = 1 and l(T, i) = 0. Notice that h solves a linear ODE system
and it can be found explicitly. With h known, l also solves a linear ODE system. The subgame
perfect strategy {π¯(t), c¯(t)}s∈[0,T ] is given by
π¯(t) = F1(t, J(t))X(t)), c¯(t) = F2(t, J(t))X(t)), (3.23)
with
F1(t, x, i) =
µ(t, i)x
σ2(t, i)
, F2(t, x, i) = h
−1(t, i)x. (3.24)
Next we want to explore the relationship between subgame perfect consumption and discount
rate. The following lemma shows that the higher discount rate the more consumption.
Lemma 3.5. Assume that ρ0 > ρ1, and h : [0, T ]×S → R
+ solves the linear ODE (3.22). Then
F2(t, x,0) > F2(t, x,1) for any x > 0. In other words the subgame perfect consumption rate is
higher in the states in which the discount rate is higher.
Appendix C proves this Theorem.

4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we use Matlab’s powerful ODE solvers (especially the functions ode23 and ode45)
to perform numerical experiments. We numerically solve ODE system (3.19) and this in turn
yield the subgame perfect strategies. Let the market coefficients be µ1 = 0.15, µ2 = 0.15, σ1 =
0.25, σ2 = 0.25, r1 = 0.05, r2 = 0.05; γ = 0.7, 0,−0.5 and −1, the discount rate ρ1 = 0.9, ρ2 =
0.3. We take the Markov Chain generator to be(
−6.04 6.04
10.9 −10.9
)
Next, define the consumption rate by
C(t, J(t)) :=
F2(t,X(t), J(t))
X(t)
= g
1
γ−1 (t, J(t)),
with the functions g(t, i) for i = 1, 2 being the solution of (3.19).
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Fig. 1. Equilibrium proportion of wealth consumed for different γ and ρ. The x axis represents
the time, and the y axis the consumption rate C.
Remark 4.1. As t→ T consumption rate approaches 1 as it was to be expected. From the picture
with γ = 0.7, we can see that the consumption rate decreases with time. This is explained by the
fact that the higher γ, the less risk aversion, which leads to higher proportion of wealth invested
into stock and less consumption. This is consistent with a graph from [11]. We see from the
graphs that consumption rate increases when γ increases (this is also consistent with graphs from
[11]). For a given risk aversion level γ, a higher discount rate will result in higher consumption
rate. The difference in the consumption rates in the two MC states is decreasing with respect to
γ.
5 Consumption versus Discount Rate
We were able to prove for the case of logarithmic utility that higher discount rates lead to higher
consumption rates. Numerical evidence suggest that this is also true for general power utilities.
On the other hand, in a model with constant discount rate the same result holds true as the
following Lemma shows.
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Lemma 5.1. Let C¯(t), t ∈ [0, T ] be the optimal consumption rate in a model with constant discount
rate ρ. Then
∂C(t)
∂ρ
> 0, t ∈ [0, T ].
Appendix D proves this Theorem.

6 Appendix
6.1 Itoˆ’s formula for Markov Chain modulated diffusions
Suppose the stochastic processes X(t) satisfies the SDE
dX(t) = µ(t,X(t), J(t))dt + σ(t,X(t), J(t))dW (t)
X(0) = x, a.s.,
for some x ∈ R, and G(·, ·, i) ∈ C1,3([0, T ]×R) for each i ∈ S. Then
G(t,X(t), J(t)) = G(0, x, J(0)) +
∫ t
0
ΓG(s,X(s), J(s))ds
+
∂G
∂x
(s,X(s), J(s))σ(s,X(s), J(s))dW (s)
+
∑
J(t)6=i
∫ t
0
(G(s,X(s), J(t)) −G(s,X(s), i))dM(t),
where
ΓG(t, x, i) =
∂G
∂t
(t, x, i) + µ(t, x, i)
∂G
∂x
(t, x, i) +
1
2
σ2(t, x, i)
∂2G
∂x2
+
∑
j∈S
λij(G(t, x, j) −G(t, x, i)).
Here M(t), t ∈ [0, T ] is the martingale process associated with the Markov Chain.
6.2 A Proof of Lemma 3.2
The existence of a unique solution g of ODE system (3.19) is granted locally in time by a fixed
point theorem. If we can establish estimates for g then this local solution is also global solution.
Let us introduce the process {M(v), v > t} by
M(v) , g(v, Jv)− g(t, Jt)−
∫ v
t
(gu(u, Ju) +
∑
j∈S
λJujg(u, j))du, (6.25)
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with g of (3.19). Dynkin formula implies that the process {M(v), v > t} defined by (6.25) is a
martingale. Further let
K(v) , exp
{∫ v
t
[
γr(u, J(u)) +
µ2(u, J(u))γ
2σ2(u, J(u))(1 − γ)
− ρJ(u)
]
du
}
. (6.26)
By product rule
d(K(v)g(v, Jv )) = K(v)
[
dg(v, Jv) + g(v, Jv)
(
γr(v, Jv) +
µ2(v, Jv)γ
2σ2(v, Jv)(1− γ)
− ρJv
)
dv
]
= K(v)[dM(v) + (γ − 1)g
γ
γ−1 (v, Jv)dv]. (6.27)
Integrating (6.27) from t to T , we get
K(T )− g(t, Jt) =
∫ T
t
K(v)dM(v) + (γ − 1)
∫ T
t
K(v)g
γ
γ−1 (v, Jv)dv. (6.28)
Taking expectation on the both sides of (6.28) and letting Jt = i, it leads to
g(t, i) = EitK(T ) + (1− γ)E
i
t
∫ T
t
K(v)g
γ
γ−1 (v, Jv)dv. (6.29)
Boundedness assumption on market coefficients makes the process {K(v), v > t} of (6.27) bounded.
This in turn yields that g(t, i) is uniformly bounded from below. Next we want to prove that is
also bounded from above. For a vector y = (y1, y2, ..., yn) in R
n we introduce the ‖ · ‖1 norm by :
‖ y ‖1=
n∑
i=1
|yi|.
When γ is positive (6.29) yields an upper bound on g (since g is bounded from below). When
γ < 0, because 0 < γ
γ−1 < 1 we get from (6.29) that
g(t, 0) < E0tK(T ) + E
0
t (1− γ)
∫ T
t
K(v)g(v, Jv)dv. (6.30)
g(t, 1) < E1tK(T ) + E
1
t (1− γ)
∫ T
t
K(v)g(v, Jv)dv. (6.31)
Thus,
||g(t, ·)||1 ≤ 2K¯ + (1− γ)K¯
∫ T
t
||g(v, ·)||1dv,
for some positive constant K¯. Gronwal’s inequality yields an upper bound on g. Next we prove
uniqueness of the solution of (3.19). Indeed, let g1 and g2 be two solutions of (3.19), then by
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(6.29) it follows that
|g1(t, i) − g2(t, i)| = (1− γ)|E
i
t
∫ T
t
K(v)g
γ
γ−1
1 (v, Jv)dv − E
i
t
∫ T
t
K(v)g
γ
γ−1
2 (v, Jv)dv|
≤ Eit
∫ T
t
K(v)|g
γ
γ−1
1 (v, Jv)− g
γ
γ−1
2 (v, Jv)|dv
≤ C1E
i
t
∫ T
t
K(v)|g1(v, Jv)− g2(v, Jv)|dv
≤ C2E
i
t
∫ T
t
|g1(v, Jv)− g2(v, Jv)|dv
≤ C2
∫ T
t
(|g1(v, i)− g2(v, i)| + |g1(v, j) − g2(v, j)|)dv
= C2
∫ T
t
||g1(v, ·)− g2(v, ·)||1dv, (6.32)
for some positive constants C1 and C2. Consequently
||g1(t, ·) − g2(t, ·)|| ≤ C2
∫ T
t
||g1(v, ·) − g2(v, ·)||dv.
Thus, by Gronwal’s inequality it follows that
g1(t, ·) = g2(t, ·).
Next we want to prove that v(t, x, i) = g(t, i)x
γ
γ
is a value function, i.e., v solves (3.13) with F1, F2
of (3.17) and X¯ of (3.18). Since the function v is sufficiently differentiable, we can compute the
derivative of v:
vt(t, x, i) = gt(t, i)
xγ
γ
, vx(t, x, i) = g(t, i)x
γ−1, vxx(t, x, i) = (γ − 1)g(t, i)x
γ−2 .
Next we show that v solves the PDE system (6.34) (which Lemma 6.1 shows that is equivalent to
(3.13)). Substituting the above derivatives into the equation (6.34) yields
∂g
∂t
(t, i)
xγ
γ
+ [(r(t, i)x+ µ(t, i)F1(t, x, i) − F2(t, x, i))g(t, i)x
γ−1 +
σ2i F
2
1 (t, x, i)
2
(γ − 1)g(t, i)xγ−2
+U(F2(t, x, i))] +
∑
j∈S
λijg(t, i)
xγ
γ
− ρig(t, i)
xγ
γ
= 0. (6.33)
After cancelation of xγ we recover the ODE system (3.19); hence v solves (6.34) (and also (3.13)).

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6.3 B Proof of Theorem 3.3
We need the following Lemma which gives a PDE version of (3.13).
Lemma 6.1. For a given i ∈ S, assume there exists a function v : [0, T ]× R+ × S → R of class
C1,2 which satisfies (3.13). Then v solves the following equation
∂v
∂t
(t, x, i) + (r(t, i)x+ µ(t, i)F1(t, x, i) − F2(t, x, i))
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i) +
σ2(t, i)F 21 (t, x, i)
2
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x, i)
+ U(F2(t, x, i)) +
∑
j∈S
λijv(t, x, j) − ρiv(t, x, i) = 0, (6.34)
with the boundary condition v(T, x, i) = U(x).
Proof: We rewrite equation (3.13) as
v(t, x, i) =
∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)f(t, s, x, i) ds + e−ρi(T−t)h(t, x, i), (6.35)
where
f(t, s, x, i) , Ex,it [U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s)))], h(t, x, i) , E
x,i
t [U(X¯(T ))].
For a fixed time s, the process {f(t, s, X¯(t), J(t))}0≤t≤s is a martingale. Thus, in the light of
(3.14) the function f, h satisfy the following PDEs :
∂f
∂t
(t, s, x, i) + (r(t, i)x + µ(t, i)F1(t, x, i) − F2(t, x, i))
∂f
∂x
(t, s, x, i)
+
σ2(t, i)F 21 (t, x, i)
2
∂2f
∂x2
(t, s, x, i) +
∑
j∈S
λijf(t, x, j) = 0, f(t, t, x, i) = U(F2(t, x, i))(6.36)
∂h
∂t
(t, s, x, i) + (r(t, i)x+ µ(t, i)F1(t, x, i) − F2(t, x, i))
∂h
∂x
(t, s, x, i)
+
σ2(t, i)F 21 (t, x, i)
2
∂2h
∂x2
(t, s, x, i) +
∑
j∈S
λijh(t, x, j) = 0, h(T, x, i) = U(x). (6.37)
By differentiating (6.35) with respect to t we get
∂v
∂t
(t, x, i) =
∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)
∂f
∂t
(t, s, x, i) ds + e−ρi(T−t)
∂h
∂t
(t, x, i) + ρiv(t, x, i) − f(t, t, x, i). (6.38)
Moreover
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i) =
∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)
∂f
∂x
(t, s, x, i) ds + e−ρi(T−t)
∂h
∂x
(t, x, i). (6.39)
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x) =
∫ T
t
e−ρi(s−t)
∂2f
∂x2
(t, s, x, i) ds + e−ρi(T−t)
∂2h
∂x2
(t, x, i). (6.40)
14
In the light of (6.36), (6.37), (6.38), (6.39) and (6.40) it follows that
∂v
∂t
(t, x, i) + (r(t, i)x+ µ(t, i)F1(t, x, i) − F2(t, x, i))
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i) +
σ2(t, i)F 21 (t, x, i)
2
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x, i)
+U(F2(t, x, i)) +
∑
j∈S
λijv(t, x, j) − ρiv(t, x, i) = 0.

Let us move to the proof of the Theorem 3.3. First let us show that
π¯(t) = F1(t, J(t),X(t)) =
µ(t, J(t))X(t)
σ2(t, J(t))(1 − γ)
, c¯(t) = F2(t, J(t)),X(t)) = g
1
γ−1 (t, J(t))X(t),
(6.41)
is admissible and it satisfies (2.4) and (2.5). This claim follows easily since X¯ of (3.18) has finite
moments of any order. Next, let us define
Γv(t, x, i) ,
∂v
∂t
(t, x, i) +
(
r(t, i)x− I
(
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)
))
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)
−
µ2(t, i)
2σ2(t, i)
[∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)]2
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x, i)
+
∑
i∈S
λij(v(t, x, i) − v(t, x, j)) + U(c). (6.42)
Γπ,cv(t, x, i) ,
∂v
∂t
(t, x, i) + (r(t, i)x− µ(t, i)π − c)
∂v
∂x
(t, x, i)
+
1
2
σ2(t, i)π2
∂2v
∂x2
(t, x, i) +
∑
i∈S
λij(v(t, x, i) − v(t, x, j)) + U(F2(t, x, i)).(6.43)
Then by the concavity of v and the first order conditions it follows that
Γv(t, x, i) = max
{π,c}
Γπ,cv(t, x, i), (F1(t, x, i), F2(t, x, i)) = argmax
{π,c}
Γπ,cv(t, x, i). (6.44)
Moreover, equation (6.34) can be written
Γv(t, x, i) = ρiv(t, x, i). (6.45)
Let us recall that
J(t, x, i, F1, F2) = v(t, x, i). (6.46)
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Thus
J(t, x, i, F1, F2)− J(t, x, i, πǫ, cǫ)
= Ex,it
[∫ t+ǫ
t
e−ρi(s−t)[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(c(s))] ds
]
+ Ex,it
[∫ T
t+ǫ
e−ρi(s−t)[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(c(s))] ds
]
+ Ex,it
[
e−ρi(T−t)(U(X¯(T ))− U(X(T )))
]
. (6.47)
In the light of inequalities (2.4) and (2.5) and Dominated Convergence Theorem
lim
ǫ↓0
E
x,i
t
[∫ t+ǫ
t
e−ρi(s−t)[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(c(s))] ds
]
ǫ
= U(F2(t, x, i) − U(c(t)).
In the light of (6.46) it follows that
E
x,i
t
[∫ T
t+ǫ
e−ρi(s−t)[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(c(s))] ds
]
+ Ex,it
[
e−ρi(T−t)(U(X¯(T ))− U(X(T )))
]
= Ex,it
[
v(t+ ǫ, X¯(t+ ǫ), J(t+ ǫ))− v(t+ ǫ,X(t+ ǫ), J(t+ ǫ))
]
+ Ex,it
[
E[
∫ T
t+ǫ
(e−ρi(s−t) − e−ρJ(t+ε)(s−t))[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(F2(s,X(s), J(s)))] ds
]
+ Ex,it
[
E[(e−ρi(T−t) − e−ρJ(t+ε)(T−t+ǫ))[U(X¯(T ))− U(X(T ))]
]
(6.48)
In the light of inequalities (2.4), (2.5) and Dominated Convergence Theorem it follows that
lim
ǫ↓0
E
x,i
t
[
(e−ρi(T−t) − e−ρJ(t+ε)(T−t+ǫ))[U(X¯(T ))− U(X(T ))]
]
ε
= λij(e
−ρi(T−t) − e−ρj(T−t))Ex,it
[
[U(X¯(T ))− U(X(T ))]
]
= 0.
By the same token one can get that
lim
ǫ↓0
E
x,i
t
[∫ T
t+ǫ(e
−ρi(s−t) − e−ρJ(t+ε)(s−t))[U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))) − U(F2(s,X(s), J(s)))] ds
]
ǫ
= 0.
Itoˆ’s formula yields
E
x,i
t
[
v(t+ ǫ, X¯(t+ ǫ), J(t+ ǫ))− v(t+ ǫ,X(t+ ǫ), J(t+ ǫ))
]
= Ex,it
∫ t+ǫ
t
[Γv(s, X¯(s), J(s)) − U(F2(s, X¯(s), J(s))]ds − E
x,i
t
∫ t+ǫ
t
[Γv(s,X(s), J(s)) − U(c(s))]ds,
Therefore
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lim
ǫ↓0
J(t, x, i, F1, F2)− J(t, x, i, πǫ, cǫ)
ǫ
= [Γv(t, x, i) − Γv(t, x, i)] ≥ 0, .
the inequality follows from (6.44).

6.4 C Proof of Lemma 3.5
We know that h(t, i) solve the ODE system
∂h
∂t
(t,0) + (λ11 − ρ0)h(t,0) + λ12h(t,1) + 1 = 0,
∂h
∂t
(t,1) + (λ22 − ρ1)h(t,1) + λ21h(t,0) + 1 = 0.
Let us define h(t) , h(t,0) − h(t,1), then h satisfies the following ODE:
h′(t) + (λ11 + λ22 − ρ0)h(t) − (ρ0 − ρ1)h(t,1) = 0
Under the assumption ρ0 > ρ1, one gets
h′(t) + (λ11 + λ22 − ρ0)h(t) > 0.
From here it follows that h(t) < 0, on [0, T ) (since h(T ) = 0). Hence, h(t,0) < h(t,1). Conse-
quently F2(t, x,0) > F2(t, x,1).

6.5 D Proof of Lemma 5.1
Here we are in the case of ρ0 = ρ1 = ρ. Further, for simplicity we assume constant market
coefficients α and σ. The optimal consumption rate is
C¯(t) =
c¯(t)
X(t)
=
η
(1 + (η − 1)eη(t−T ))
, (6.49)
where η ,
ρ−γ[
(α−r)2
2σ2(1−γ)
+r]
1−γ . It follows from direct computations that
∂C¯
∂ρ
= −
1
C¯2(t)
[−
1
(1− γ)η2
+ eη(t−T )
1 + η(η − 1)(t− T )
η2(1− γ)
] (6.50)
If 1 + η(η − 1)(t− T ) ≤ 0 the claim follows. Otherwise, since
eη(T−t) > 1 + η(T − t) > 1 + η(T − t) + η2(t− T ),
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it follows that
eη(t−T ) <
1
1 + η(η − 1)(t− T )
, (6.51)
whence the result.

References
[1] Das M. (2003) Optimal growth with decreasing marginal impatience, Journal of Economic
Dynamics & Control, 27, 1881-1898.
[2] Ekeland, I. and Lazrak, A. (2010), The golden rule when preferences are time inconsis-
tent, Mathematics and Financial Economics, 4, 1-27.
[3] Ekeland, I. and Pirvu, T. A. (2008), Investment and consumption without commitment,
Mathematics and Financial Economics, 2, 57-86.
[4] Ekeland, I., Mbodji, O., and Pirvu, T. A. (2010) Time consistent portfolio manage-
ment, http://arxiv.org/pdf/1008.3407 .
[5] Elliott, R. J., Chan, L., and Siu, K., T. (2005) Option pricing and Esscher transform
under regime switching, Annals of Finance 1, 423-432.
[6] Epstein, L. G. and Hynes, J. A. (1983) The rate of time preference and dynamic economic
analysis, Journal of Political Economy, 91, 611-635
[7] Guo, X. (2001) Information and option pricing , Quantitative Finance 1, 38-44.
[8] Koopmans, T.C. (1960) Stationary utility and impatience, Econometrica 28, 287-309.
[9] Krusell, P and Smith, A. (2003) Consumption and Savings Decisions with Quasi-
geometric Discounting, Econometrica 71, 365-375.
[10] Laibson, D. (1997) Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 112, 443-477.
[11] Merton, R. C. (1969) Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: the continuous-time
case, Rev. Econom. Statist. 51, 247-257.
[12] Merton, R.C. ( 1971) Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a conitinuous-time
model. J. Economic Theory, 3, 373-413.
18
[13] Strotz R. (1955) Myopia and inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, Rev. Finan-
cial Stud., 23, 165-180.
[14] Sotomayor, L. R. and Cadenillas, A. (2009) Explicit Solutions of Consumption-
Investment Problems in Financial Markets with Regime Switching, Mathematical Finance, 9
(2), 251-279.
[15] Takashi K. (2000) Increasing Marginal Impatience and Intertemporal Substitution Journal
of Economics, 72, 67-79.
[16] Toshihiko M. (2009) A note on cyclical discount factors and labor market volatility.
Preprint.
[17] Uzawa, H. (1968) Time preference, the consumption function, and optimum holdings In:
Wolfe, J.N. (Ed.), Value, Capital and Growth: Papers in Honour of Sir John Hicks. Edin-
burgh University Press, Edinburgh.
19
